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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW,
STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying Ronald's petition to modify when
it concluded that Ronald's forced retirement in 1997, and the commencement of Social
Security benefits for both parties in 1997, were foreseeable events in 1987.
Standard of Review: This issue is a mixed question of fact and law and is
reviewed in part for correctness, in part for an abuse of discretion, and under a clearly
erroneous standard. See State of Utah v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Wells v.
Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Moore v. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved when the Appellant timely filed
on February 12, 1999, his Notice of Appeal in the trial court.
2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in finding no substantial change in
circumstances that was not contemplated at the time the Decree was entered, despite the
fact that the Appellant's income had decreased by 48% from the time the Decree was
entered.
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Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Wells v.
Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved when the Appellant timely filed
on February 12, 1999, his Notice of Appeal in the trial court.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i):
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and
new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. The Petitioner/Appellee, Frances R. Bolliger ("Frances"), is a resident of Arizona;
the Respondent/Appellant, Ronald E. Bolliger ("Ronald") is a temporary resident of
Nevada. (R. 111.)
2. Frances will be 64 years of age on September 5, 1999; Ronald became 64 years of
age on January 23, 1999. (R. 111.)
3. Frances and Ronald were married approximately 34 years prior to their divorce in
1987; they have three adult children of issue from their marriage, all of whom live in the
Phoenix, Arizona area where Frances resides. (R. 112.)
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4. Frances has remained unmarried since her divorce from Ronald; Ronald remarried
in April 1989 and today remains married to the same person. (R. 112.)
5. Frances has two basic sources of income: (a) Social Security Benefits in the
amount of $521 per month and (b) alimony from Ronald in the approximate amount of
$1,869 per month, for a total of $2,390 per month. (R. 112.) The alimony amount of
$1,869 is further derived from two sources: (1) half of the Respondent's Air Force
Retirement in the amount of $1,184 per month and a set amoimt paid directly by Ronald
of $685 per month, both set by a decree of divorce entered on March 3, 1987. (R. 112.)
6. In addition, Frances claims that the premium for the Air Force Survivor's Benefit
Plan, in an amount that is approximately $160 per month, should be paid by Ronald
without any deduction for such amountfromthe monthly alimony payment of $685.
(R. 112.) Ronald believes the decree provides that such premium, which varies from time
to time, is included in and a part of the $685 alimony payment. (R. 112.)
7. Ronald has three basic sources of income: (a) Social Security Benefits in the
amount of $1,071; (b) half of his Air Force Retirement in the amount of $1,184 per
month (the same as received by Frances); and (c) pension payments from L3
Commimications in the amoimt of $682 per month, for a total of $2,937 per month, prior
to making payments to Frances in the amount of $685 per month. (R. 112-13.) After
paying Frances and paying $160 per month to maintain her survivor's insurance, Ronald
is left with only $2,092 per month, or, $298 per month kss than Frances. (R. 112-13.)
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8. At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered by this Court, Ronald was earning
approximately $5,700 per month from his Air Force Retirement and from employment at
Sperry (formerly Sperry Rand, later acquired by Lockheed Martin, and later changed to
L3 Communications). (R. 113.) Ronald's monthly income today is $2.763 less than it
was at the time the Decree was entered, or 48% less. (R. 113.)
9. Ronald's Adjusted Gross Income ("AGI") in 1996 was $90,040; his AGI in 1997
was $58,286 (a transition year to retirement); and his expected AGI for 1998 is $28,764
based on current income. (R. 113.) Ronald's income today has decreased by 68% from
1996 and by 50% from 1997. (R. 113.)
10. Ronald was employed full-time from 1984 to March 1997 until he was forced to
accept early retirement through a reduction in force from L3 Communications. (R. 113.)
After his retirement from the Air Force and during his employment at L3
Communications, Ronald qualified for and has earned a pension from L3
Communications in the amount of $682 per month. (R. 113.)
11. Frances ceased employment in or about June 1991, and has not been gainfully
employed since that time. (R. 113.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The trial court erred by concluding that it was foreseeable in 1987 that Ronald
would be forced to retire early and that he and Frances would begin receiving Social
Security Benefits in 1997. The trial court, however, offered no reasoning as to how the
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parties could have foreseen that Ronald would be forced to retire at age 62 and also
foreseen the definite amounts that each would receive in Social Security Benefits.
The Code provides for modification of a divorce decree to allow for unforeseen
events such as the unexpected termination of Ronald's employment. Although retirement
in a general sense was foreseeable, the timing and the financial details were not
foreseeable with any degree of certainty in 1987. Therefore, the parties rightfully could
rely on the protection afforded them by the Code to modify the Decree when and if there
became a substantial, material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time.
Ronald's forced retirement was not foreseeable and there is no evidence in the record
to the contrary. The trial court merely concluded that in 1987, Ronald should have
foreseen that he could be forced to retire at the age of 62, that Frances would elect to
begin receiving Social Security Benefits at the age of 62, and that his aggregate income
would decline by 48%. Such a conclusion is without basis in fact or law or logic.
II. The changes in incomes of the parties is a substantial and material change that
justifies a reduction in alimony payments to Frances by an amount at least equal to the
amount of her Social Security Benefits. Ronald's income has declined by 48%. At the
same time, Frances's income has increased due to her Social Security Benefits. It is
appropriate therefore that Ronald's alimony burden be reduced by the amount of Social
Security Benefits being received by Frances.
Frances has not shown any need for additional income, while Ronald has shown that
his income has declined substantially. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to make any
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findings of fact or law concerning the needs and financial condition of Frances. There
certainly was no finding that she is in need of the sudden windfall resulting from Social
Security Benefits.
The trial court predicated its conclusion that Ronald's decrease in income was or
should have been a foreseeable event in 1987, although there is no evidence to support
such a conclusion. The Decree is silent on the matter and no extrinsic evidence has been
produced to show that any retirement issues were considered in 1987, the year of the
subject Decree.
ARGUMENT
In 1997. Ronald's income decreased substantially because he was forced to retire
early and at the same time Frances began receiving Social Security Benefits:
such changes (1) were not foreseeable in 1987: and (2) are substantial and
material changes that justify a reduction in alimony payments to Frances.
Ronald filed a petition to modify the Decree that was entered in 1987. His petition
sought to only reduce, not eliminate, alimony payments to Frances in an amount equal to
the Social Security Benefits being received by Frances. (R. 044.) Ronald's request to
modify the Decree is governed by Utah's Code, § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i):
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and
new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in

circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
§ 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), U.C.A. (emphasis added).
The alimony established in 1987 "must be readily susceptible to alteration at a later
date." See Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) {citing
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Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982)). The basis for modifying alimony
payments is to serve its fundamental purpose, which is
"to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse
from becoming a public charge." See id
To prevail on his petition to modify, Ronald must establish that a "substantial change
of circumstances has occurred which justifies modification." See Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d
241 at 242 {citing Paffel v. Pqjffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)). A substantial change
in income by one of the parties may be sufficient to establish a substantial change in
circumstances. Also, where one party begins to receive Social Security benefits or other
retirement benefits, a substantial change in circumstances may exist. See Munns v.
Murms, 790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
A. Ronald's forced retirement in 1997 was not foreseeable in 1987,
The Decree is void of any mention or reference of retirement benefits for either
party. See (R. 037-41.) It is also void any consideration of Ronald's retirement, whether
voluntary or involuntary. See id. There is nothing in the Decree or the record to indicate
that Social Security Benefits were estimated or considered for either party. See id.
Despite a substantial change in the relative incomes between the parties, (R. 111-13.), the
trial court found no substantial change in circumstances, (R. 256.); (R. 269 at 4.);
Addendum at 4, for
"a man who is 62 years of age [and] who reached the age when he had
the option to retire." (R. 269 at 6.); Addendum at 6 (emphasis added).
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Although Ronald continued working and enjoying an every increasing salary, he was
forced to retire early at the age of 62. (R. 113.) The record contains no suggestion that
Ronald's forced retirement was even remotely contemplated in 1987. Further, it is
unreasonable to suggest that such event should have been contemplated at the time the
Decree was entered. If the Court were to impose a duty on all divorcing parties to draft
stipulations and decrees that cover every possible contingency, the legal costs for
divorcing parties would be even more burdensome that it is now.
Moreover, the Code itself expressly contemplates that decrees are subject to
modification. See § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), U.C.A. Such allowance for modification cannot
logically impose a strict duty on the parties to plan for or consider every contingency that
otherwise attends normal contract law. Rather, Decrees are governed by statute and are
expressly subject to modification. The only qualification the law imposes is that there be
"a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce." See § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), U.C.A. The statute empowers this Court to determine
whether Ronald's forced retirement in 1997 was foreseeable in 1987, the year the Decree
was entered.
It is interesting and of some importance to note that the statute, § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i),
U.C.A., does not use the word "reasonably" to modify or limit "foreseeable" as is most
often the case in negligence cases. Accordingly, the statute only requires a change in
circumstances which is "not foreseeable" rather than "not reasonably foreseeable." In the
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instant case, there is not a scintilla of evidence that Ronald's forced retirement in 1997
was foreseeable or reasonably foreseeable in 1987.
The trial court appears to have based its conclusion that Ronald's forced retirement
was foreseeable on the fact that Ronald was 62 years of age and "he had the option to
retire." See (R. 269 at 6.); Addendum at 6. The trial court did acknowledge, however,
that had Ronald lost his job the day after his divorce, "that probably would have been a
change of circumstances. But not at 62." (R. 269 at 5.); Addendum at 5. In effect, the
trial court seems to conclude that an event occurring the day after the entry of the Decree
is less foreseeable than an event that occurs 10 years later. Such reasoning seems
illogical and bizarre.
Under the trial court's reasoning, Ronald's forced retirement, standing alone, may
likely be a change of circumstances. However, since Ronald could have optionally taken
early retirement, then according to the trial court, it is not a change of circumstances.1
That is, it appears that the trial court would not and does not consider that forced
retirement is equivalent to an employee losing a job, if the fired employee could have
optionally taken early retirement or found comparable employment. Such reasoning is
faulty and does not take into account the difficulty of finding comparable employment at
the age of 62.

1

The trial court loosely interchanges and perhaps confuses the distinction
between "change in circumstances" and "foreseeable" Or, in the alternative, the trial court
merely omits the qualifying term "foreseeable" in each instance where it states the
necessity of being a "change in circumstances."
Page 12 of 26

For example, assume Ronald had been fired at the age of 58 and that he found other
employment, although at substantially less compensation than previously enjoyed by him.
The trial court's reasoning would then lead it to conclude that such a forced change in
employment was a foreseeable change of circumstances because Ronald could have opted
to terminate his own employment. The trial court also makes no allowance for a change
in compensation if such change occurs at age 62 or later, regardless of the substantiality
of the change in compensation.
Had Ronald not been forced to retire at age 62, he could have continued working
until age 70 or beyond, health permitting. His annual compensation was approximately
$90,000 in 1996. (R. 113.) Eight more years at that income level would have made an
enormous difference in his savings compared to his Social Security Benefits of $1,071
per month, or $12,852 annually. (R. 112.)
Before taxes and any further increases in salary, Ronald's income during those eight
years could easily have been more than $617,0002 greater than he is now realizing from
his forced retirement. Assuming a tax rate of 35%, his after-tax income could be more
than $400,000 greater than under the present circumstances. At a modest annual interest
rate of 5%, that potential increase could yield more than $1,600 per month; a rather tidy
sum when compared with $685 Ronald is now required to pay to Frances, in addition to
the $1,184 she receives from his Air Force Retirement.

2

Taking Ronald's annual income at $90,000 less his Social Security of $12,852
and multiplying that incremental difference by 8 years yields $617,184.
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The trial court concluded that since the Decree is silent on the effects of retirement
by either party, the parties must have or should have considered such effects in 1987.
The trial court concludes that the effects of retirement, positive for Frances and negative
for Ronald, were foreseeable in 1987 by the parties. Ronald urges this Court to find that
his forced retirement in 1997 was not foreseeable in 1987, nor should it have been
foreseeable.
Finally, the parties could not, in 1987, have reasonably forecasted with any degree of
accuracy or certainty their respective benefits under Social Security. The parties have no
control over Congress or the Social Security Administration. Without retaining an expert,
the parties were not in a position in 1987 to reasonably estimate the effects of Social
Security Benefits ten years later. See Munns, 790 P.2d 116 at 123 (the court may modify
the alimony award at such time as the actual amounts of Social Security Benefits become
definite). Furthermore, neither party contemplated taking early retirement or seeking
Social Security Benefits at age 62. The parties must apply for Social Security Benefits;
nothing is automatic nor guaranteed.
It is also reasonable and logical for the parties to rely on § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), U.C.A.
Since the statute permits modification of a decree if there is a substantial change in
circumstances, the parties could legitimately rely in 1987 on their right to petition the
court for a modification of the terms of the Decree. They were not obligated in 1987 to
accept the terms of the Decree as being eternal when the statute provides otherwise. It is
simply logical, reasonable, and likely that the parties considered their retirement years but
Page 14 of 26

did not believe it necessary or wise to incorporate anything definitive into the Decree.
Rather, they could rely on the law to protect them.
Since they could not have determined the amount and timing of their respective
benefits with any reasonable certainty, they could have only added general language to
the Decree that would provide for a modification of alimony payments. Such language,
however, would simply paraphrase or duplicate the statutory language of
§30-3-5(7)(g)(i),aCA
The result of the trial court's ruling vitiates § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), £/.C.A, by forcing an
unreasonable standard of what is foreseeable. This Court should, therefore, clarify that a
person's forced retirement ten years later is not foreseeable as a matter of law, or, that the
facts in this case clearly do not support any conclusion that Ronald's forced retirement
was foreseeable in 1987. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding the amounts and timing
of Social Security Benefits some 10 years in the future makes it highly unlikely that such
events should be considered foreseeable.

B. Ronald's decrease in income and Frances' increase in income, especially
relative to each other, represents a substantial change that justifies a
reduction in alimony payments to FranceSt
Depending on how the change in Ronald's income is measured, the decrease in
Ronald's gross income, subsequent to his forced retirement, ranges from 30% to 49%.
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For example, in 1987, Ronald's income was $70,181, or $5,848 per month.3 (R. 113.)
Ronald's 1998 monthly gross income is comprised of three retirement sources: Social
Security of $1,071 + Air Force Retirement of $2,368 + L3 Communications of $682, for a
monthly total of $4,121. (R. 112.) Compared with his 1987 monthly income of $5,848,
Ronald's current gross income is 30% less.
However, the above analysis does not reflect the effects of inflation. At a 3% rate of
inflation for 11 years, $5,848 would be $8,095 in current dollars. Using the 1987
income, adjusted for inflation, Ronald's current income of $4,121 is 49% less than it was
in 1987. At a 2% rate of inflation, $5,848 would be $7,272 in current dollars. Based on
a 2% rate of inflation, Ronald's current income of $4,121 is 43% less than his 1987
income adjusted for inflation.
Using the same methodology for Frances, the amount of change in her income is
significantly less than, the change in Ronald's income when calculating her current
income. In 1987, the Petitioner's monthly income was $835 from the Air Force
Retirement + $685 from Ronald, for a total of $1,520. In 1998, her monthly income is
$521 from Social Security + $1,184 from the Air Force Retirement + $685 in alimony
from Ronald, for a total monthly income of $2,390. This represents a gain of 57% over
her 1987 income. Adjusting for inflation, $1,520 would be $1,890 in current dollars at a

3

The Stipulation by the parties estimated Ronald's income at $5,700 per month.
(R. 113.) However, upon obtaining a copy of Ronald's tax return, it was discovered to be
slightly higher. (R. 148.)
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2% inflation rate and $2,104 in current dollars at a 3% inflation rate. The decrease in
income is therefore 26% at 2% inflation and 14% at 3% inflation.
The above analyses are summarized for the Court's convenience in Table 1 below.
Table 1 also shows the dollar differences between the 1987 and 1998 gross incomes.

TABLE 1
Change in Gross Monthly Income From 1987
Prior to Payments to Frances
Frances

Ronald

No Inflation

+ 57%

+$870

- 30%

($1,727)

2% Inflation

+ 26%

+$500

- 43%

($3,151)

[ 3% Inflation

+ 14%

+$286

- 49%

($3,974)

When comparing Ronald's change in income with the change in income for Frances,
it is clear that Ronald has suffered far more than Frances. If Ronald continues paying
$685 alimony to Frances, her income will be greater today than it was in 1987, even after
adjusting for inflation at 2% or 3%. In contrast, Ronald's gross income will be less,
regardless of inflation, than it was in 1987. In fact, Frances's current monthly income
exceeds the net income of Ronald by $298.4

4

Frances's monthly income as shown above is $2,390; Ronald's net income
after payments to and for Frances is $2,092 ($4,121 — $1,184 — $685—$160). Thus
the Petitioner's income is $298 more than Ronald's net income.
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Using the same methodology as above, changes in "net income" are summarized
below in Table 2. For this purpose, "net income" differs from "gross income" only by the
deductions for Ronald's payments to Frances plus his monthly payment of $160 to
maintain survivor's insurance for Frances. Therefore, the column for Frances in Table 2
is identical to her column in Table 1. Ronald's column, however, shows that his
percentage decrease in net income is far worse, being 48% without adjusting for inflation
and 62% adjusted for 3% inflation.
TABLE 2
Change in Net Monthly Income From 1987
After AH Payments to Frances
Frances

Ronald

No Inflation

+ 57%

+$870

- 48%

($2,076)

2% Inflation

+ 26%

+$500

- 58%

($3,129)

3% Inflation

+ 14%

+$286

- 62%

($3,738) |

Using the same methodology, Ronald's and Frances's net income can be calculated
assuming that Ronald's alimony obligation of $685 is terminated. These data are
summarized below in Table 3. Since the elimination of the $685 alimony payment affects
both Frances and Ronald, the columns for each are different in Table 3 than those found
in Tables 1 and 2 above.
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TABLE 3
Change in Net Monthly Income From 1987
After All Payments to Frances
AND Excluding $685 Payment in 1998
Frances

Ronald

No Inflation

+ 12%

+$185

- 32%

($1,391)

2% Inflation

- 20%

($185)

- 45%

($2,444)

3% Inflation

- 28%

($399)

- 51%

($3,053)

By eliminating the $685 alimony payment, Table 3 shows that Ronald will not
maintain his relative income against that of Frances. To do so would also require a
reduction in the one-half portion of Ronald's Air Force Retirement that is being paid to
Frances. Ronald has not heretofore suggested any reduction in the portion of his
retirement benefits going to Frances. However, the data in the above tables show that he
is entitled to relief from the $685 alimony payment that has so devastated him and his
current wife of 10 years.
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that Ronald's income has suffered substantially
since his retirement. At the same time, Frances has improved her financial situation from
the onset of Social Security Benefits. Maintaining the $685 alimony payment,
perpetuates an injustice and an unintended consequence of the Decree. The Decree was
not intended to punish Ronald and reward Frances. However, under the current financial
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conditions of the parties, the Decree is doing just that. The Decree should be modified to
maintain the living standards enjoyed by both parties during the marriage.
Further, the $682 per month that Ronald receives from L3 Communications as
retirement income is only possible because Ronald chose to continue working for 11
years following the parties1 divorce. Ronald's work ethic is now working to his
disadvantage. Such a result is counter to public policy that encourages industry, a work
ethic, and self-reliance.
If Ronald had not worked for the past 11 years, he would not be entitled to the $682
per month and his lower income would tip the scale farther toward a reduction or
elimination of alimony. In other words, if Ronald were not receiving $682 from L3
Communications, he clearly would not be able to pay $685 in alimony to Frances. In that
case, the $685 in alimony would of necessity be terminated, and he would, in effect, be
rewarded for not working during those 11 years. On the othei hand, since Frances chose
not to work for those same 11 years, Ronald should not be punished by taking his $682 in
retirement from L3 and transferring it in the form of alimony to Frances. If this were so,
it would turn public policy on its head.
From the above, it is clear that a substantial change exists with respect to Ronald's
income and with respect to the relative incomes between the parties. There is no
justification for Frances to keep as a windfall her Social Security Benefits while Ronald's
income has been cut by 48% due to forced retirement.
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C. The trial court made no findings on the financial condition and ability to
earn or pay by the parties: the three factors set forth in Bridenbaugh.
The Court in Bridenbaugh, articulated the purpose of alimony:
"The fundamental purpose of alimony 'is to enable the receiving spouse
to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a public
charge/"
Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d at 242 (citing Paffel, 732 P.2d at 100).
The Bridenbaugh Court also reaffirmed the three factors to be considered in
adjusting alimony payments:
1.

The financial condition and needs of the spouse claiming support;

2.

The ability of that spouse to provide sufficient income for herself; and

3.

The ability of the responding spouse to provide the support.

See id. at 242.
Even though a responding spouse may have the economic ability to provide support,
if the other two factors do not establish that the receiving spouse needs support to
maintain her living standard enjoyed during the marriage, the courts have reduced or
terminated alimony. See Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241 at 243 (where former husband's
income was $240,000 per year to support his family of four and where he had a net worth
of approximately $2,500,000, termination of alimony was appropriate where the receiving
spouse's income was only $22,000 per year to support herself only).
The only sources of data to analyze the "needs" of the parties are found in the
financial declarations filed by the parties. (R. 087-95, 098-103.) The two essential
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categories of needs are "monthly payments" for debts and "monthly expenses." See id
The monthly payments for each category and for each party are summarized in Table 4
below, including an "adjusted income" line that reflects Ronald's payment for his mobile
home where he and his present wife reside and which is comparable to Frances's rent:5
TABLE 4
Petitioner

Respondent

$550

$1,693

Monthly Expenses

$2,303

$3,218

Monthly Income ($685 Alimony Eliminated)

$1,705

$2,937

135%

110%

1

Adjusted Monthly Expenses (Mobile Home)

$2,303

$3,701

1

Adjusted Monthly Expenses as % of Income

135%

126%

|

$2,853

$4,911

1

167%

167%

|

Monthly Payments on Debts

Monthly Expenses as % of Income

Total Payments and Expenses
[Total Payments and Expenses as % of Income

Table 4 shows that by reducing the amount of support payments to Frances from
$1,869 per month to $1,184, the percent of each parties' monthly payments and expenses
is identical, at 167%.6 The percentages in the last line of the Table 2 also show that the
income of each party is less than her or his monthly outflows; signaling an obvious

5

Ronald remarried in 1987, and he now lives with his wife in a mobile home.
They do not own any real estate. Ronald's residence, therefore, is his mobile home and
the payments on it are equivalent to mortgage payments or rent.
6

It is coincidental that 167% was the result for each party.
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problem for each party. However, they each have essentially the same level of difficulty
in meeting monthly payments for debt and living expenses. Even if the parties' debts are
excluded and only their adjusted monthly expenses are considered, the parties are fairly
comparable at 137% for Frances and 126% for Ronald.
If the analysis contained in Table 4 is repeated with the $685 alimony payment in
place, the parties' percentages of payments and expenses of adjusted monthly income are
119% and 218%, respectively. This shows that Ronald does not have the ability to
provide $685 in alimony to Frances. Thus, the third Bridenbaugh factor tips in favor of
eliminating the $685 alimony payment. The second Bridenbaugh factor is neutral or tips
in Ronald's favor, since Frances's income has actually increased since 1987, and she has
been able to support herself without becoming a ward of the state.
CONCLUSION
Ronald's forced retirement in 1997 was clearly not foreseeable in 1987. Even if the
possibility was contemplated, the parties had no duty to incorporate language in the
Decree that would only duplicate the essence of § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), U.C.A., since the
statute itself provides for modification. Further, Ronald's income today is substantially
less than it was in 1987, while Frances's income is greater. If Ronald's obligation for
alimony is not reduced, the net effect will be to penalize him for working for 10 years in
order to become eligible for a pension that is roughly equal to the amount he is directly
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paying to Frances. In other words, the benefits of Ronald's work ethic are transferred to
Frances, who chose not to work after 1990.
This Court should restore equity to these parties. By eliminating the $685 Ronald
now pays monthly to Frances, Frances' income remains essentially the same as it was
prior to receiving her Social Security Benefits. Equally fair, by eliminating the $685
Ronald now pays monthly to Frances, Ronald's income will still be substantially less than
he has enjoyed from thefruitsof his labors during the ten years following his divorce
from Frances.
Ronald, therefore, requests this Court to order a modification of the Decree by
eliminating the $685 alimony payment now required of Ronald or at least reducing the
alimony by the amount of Social Security Benefits being received by Frances. In the
alternative, Ronald requests this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling that Ronald's
forced retirement was foreseeable and remand for a determination of the change in
alimony that is appropriate based on the financial conditions and needs of the parties.
Ronald further requests this Court to reverse the award of attorney's fees by the trial
court and to award him his attorney's fees at the trial court. Ronald also requests this
Court to award him his attorney's fees on this appeal.

DATED this 19th day of August 1999.

Michael A. Jensen /
J
Attorney for RonalcHE^Bolliger, Respondent/Appellant
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FRANCES R. BOLLIGER
Plaintiff,
VS

CASE NO. 854903252
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BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENROID, JUDGE

SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84114-1860

VIDEO TRAPE TRANSCRIPTION OF PROCEEDINGS
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2
A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE

PLAINTIFF:
SUZANNE MARELIUS
Attorney at Law

FOR THE D E F E N D A N T :
MICHAEL A. JENSEN
Attorney at Law

3
Salt Lake City, Utah; Tuesday, December

8,

1998

P R O C E E D I N G S
(TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM VIDEO
THE COURT:
Bolliger versus

Good morning.

Ready

on

Bolliger?

MS. MARELIUS:
THE COURT:
submissions and I've
I'll

TAPE)

Y e s , your Honor.

Okay.

I read all

the

pretty well made my mind up, but

hear anything that you want to argue.
I'm

serious, Mr. Jensen.

going to end one way, but

I'm

This is only

also happy to let you

proffer anything you want, or argue the law any way
you w a n t .
MR. JENSEN:

Wonder if we're wasting

our

time .
THE COURT:

I think you are.

MR. JENSEN:
THE COURT:

Court's time.
Your client

can't win.

He has

got no change in circumstances, and the plain
language of the divorce decree says he can't
that insurance premium.
that he paid.
Mrs.

And I would award attorney

total

fees to

Bolliger.
MR. JENSEN:

of

That's part of the

deduct

circumstances?

Your Honor, there's no

change

4
THE COURT:

The change

order to warrant modifying

in circumstances,

in

decree of divorce, has to

be something not contemplated

at the time of

the

entry of the decree.
Clearly retirement

is always

when people get to be the age of 63.
change by itself.
change

That can't be a

If anybody has had a

in circumstances

of THE changes

contemplated

it's the p e t i t i o n e r

in her health situation.

going to make a change based on that
MR. JENSEN:
THE COURT:
MR. JENSEN:

substantial
because

I'm

not

either.

If I may, your Honor.
Sure.
Two things.

There's case

that suggests that the introduction of
security by either party is the grounds

law

social
for a change

of c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
THE COURT:
wrong and I'm
throughout.

sure it wouldn't be

beyond

consistent

Everybody who's worked

number of quarters
security.

Well, then the case law is

the

is going to qualify

for

So that also can't be something

the contemplation of the parties

who did this to themselves, because
stipulated

requisite
social
that

in this

it was a

divorce.
He knew she would retire.

She knew he

was
case

5
would retire.

They both knew that they would be

getting

security and they both knew that

social

would be sharing retirement
MR. JENSEN:
two things.

proceeds.

I suggest, your Honor, that --

One is that the -- in this case

respondent was put into early retirement

anticipate

the

Basically

And at age 6 2 , he did not

losing his job at age 6 2 .
to work.

He

anticipated

continuing

reduction.

That's not an anticipated

your Honor.

the

through

force reduction that was not anticipated.
he lost his job.

they

fully

That's a forced

It wasn't contemplated

circumstance,

in any way.

Suppose he lost his job the day after

the

divorce?
THE COURT:

That probably would have been a

change of circumstances.
MR. JENSEN:

But not at 6 2 .

There was no

contemplation

that the man would retire, your Honor.
mention of it whatsoever

There is no

in the d e c r e e .

be, and the contemplation of something

There

can't

that is not

even mentioned, your Honor, age 62 when he was let go
and his work.
year.

He was making at that time $90,000 a

He could have earned

his retirement

substantially more

and savings over the next

There was no mandatory retirement

for

few y e a r s .

contemplated.

6
There was no contemplation of an early
know, or

firing,

you

termination.
THE COURT:

Reduction

MR. JENSEN:

Yeah.

in force.

There can't be -- so

that's stipulated, your Honor, so that can't be -that's stipulated

now.

THE COURT:
in circumstances
reached
anyway.

It's not a substantial

change

for a man who is 62 years of age who

the age when he had the option to retire,
Plus he's still got the option of

another job and going forward.

Doesn't

finding

have to, but

that's certainly a legitimate option for him.
MR. JENSEN:

And

--(inaudible)

no contemplation of the amount of social
either side.

So at that the point

-- there was
security

in time there

no estimate m a d e , there was no discussion about
it might b e .

was
what

And so the total dollars on either

certainly wasn't waived

in determining what

alimony had to be forever. Certainly

there's

by

side

their
--

(inaudible).
THE COURT:

Your client

alimony would be forever.

stipulated

that

the

I think this is very

clearly a case where now that he has reached age 63
and life isn't exactly the way he hoped

it would be

that he realizes he made a bad b a r g a i n .

And he may

7
have made an unfair bargain, but we don't have a
substantial

change of circumstances

warrant modifying

sufficient

to

the decree.

MR. JENSEN:

(Inaudible)

case law in here is perfectly
THE COURT:
clear, Mr. Jensen.

-- think the

other

clear.

I think this case is

absolutely

I don't think it's a close

call

by a m i l e .
MR. JENSEN:
that
the

--(inaudible)--

The case law

suggests

alimony can change, depending

on

circumstances.
THE COURT:

That's right.

based on the stipulated

And

facts submitted

I'm

finding,

to me, that

there has not been a factual change sufficient

to

meet the standard the court r e q u i r e s , which is a
substantial material
contemplated

change of circumstances

at the time of entry of the decree.

Parties are on a track that should have
anticipated,

not

should have been discussed.

been
I don't

know what they talked about with their lawyers.
M s . Marelius was there, but none of the rest of us
was there back then.
This is not a case for a modification
divorce

of

decree.
As a matter of fact, where the parties

are

8
right now is not unfair.

Even if you could

show

Even if she's making

more

me
MR. JENSEN:
money now than he is?
THE COURT:

What?

MR. JENSEN:
THE COURT:

Beg your
Fifty

MR. JENSEN:
THE COURT:

Fifty

dollars?

pardon?

dollars?

(Inaudible.)
Supporting

a wife was

clearly

completely

irrelevant.

That's a choice he made

subsequent

to entry of the decree of d i v o r c e .

wanted to get into that, I'm

sure the other

would want to get into her earnings or her
capacity, which is also not
MR. JENSEN:

I'm

$138 more than he does
THE COURT:
significant

--

If you

side
earning

relevant.
just

saying

she now makes

(inaudible).

I don't

find that to be

in any way.

If you want to look at f a i r n e s s , she got
treated unfairly
decree until now.

from the time of the entry of the
Maybe

it's a little more fair now,

but, again, that's the p a r t i e s ' choice.
that agreement

the same way he made the

MR. JENSEN:
THE COURT:

Let me ask -Yeah.

She made
agreement.

9
MR. JENSEN:

-- the Court, your Honor, on

the other point about the insurance
THE COURT:

Clearly

addition, not a deduction

premium.

intended

from.

To read

sentence any other way is to torture
Plus, we have an estoppel
MR. JENSEN:
THE COURT:

to be an
that

it to death.

issue on that one.

Beg your

pardon?

I said we have an

estoppel

issue on that one, because of his course of

conduct

since entry of decree until very recently.

He would

have been bound by his conduct
MS. MARELIUS:
maintenance

in any event.

Our third

of life insurance.

was employed

issue was his

There was

and had this corporate

-- when he

status he had

86,000 available, and that's how much he was making.
He now indicates that since his retirement

he is not

able to keep the veterans policy at 3 6 , 0 0 0 .
discovery

indicated he could be making

that correct?

So that was a third

MR. JENSEN:

50,000.

Is

issue.

Insurance policy

terminated when he was terminated

I think

was

from employment.

He had no ability to carry that on.
MS. MARELIUS:

I would

-- and I appreciate

that may be a change that is not under his control,
but I think he should be mandated

to make

some

10
supplemental

life insurance

THE COURT:

to cover

Well,

alimony.

I wouldn't

order him to

maintain a policy that he can't maintain any

longer.

If this case was before me for the first time, I
don't ever order anybody to buy life insurance
cover alimony.

Alimony terminates, by operation of

law, upon the death of one of the p a r t i e s ,
they stipulate otherwise.

on life insurance.

to maintain

That's correct, isn't

MS. MARELIUS:
THE COURT:
a change

unless

But they did stipulate

this case that he would continue

warranting

to

in

payments

it?

Yes.

Well,

I don't

in that except

see any
that

I'm

to order him to maintain a policy he can't

change
not

going

maintain

anymore.
MS. MARELIUS:
THE COURT:

Okay.

She's entitled

to fees and

c o s t s , and I'm not going to find c o n t e m p t .
however misguided,
change.

it was not a bad-faith effort

He should not have unilaterally have

making p a y m e n t s .
interest.

I think,

I'm

She's entitled

not going to make a contempt

Anything

fees.

stopped
plus

finding.

I missed?

MS. MARELIUS:
of costs and

to a judgment

to

I will submit

an

affidavit

11
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MS. MARELIUS:
THE COURT:

All

MS. MARELIUS:

I will be glad to do that
right.
Thank you, your Honor.

(Proceedings

in the

above-entit led matter
concluded.)
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